,even if no comparable progress is achieved on other files.Perhaps what deserves particular attention is that this vision is no longer mere political rhetoric; it has found practical applications. Iran moved swiftly to intervene and turn back vessels that attempted to transit through the Omani channel of the strait, and in some cases drones were used to strike them — an act that reflects its conception of its role in controlling maritime traffic.That is to say, it seeks to monopolise influence in the Gulf. The irony is that this occurred even in the Omani channel, at a time when the Sultanate of Oman was exerting distinguished diplomatic efforts to mediate between the disputing parties, placing a portion of its own security and stability at stake in order to keep the door of dialogue open.Nevertheless, any infringement on freedom of navigation in this region does not threaten Gulf interests alone; it places Omani security itself before additional challenges and sends alarming messages to the international community, which for the most part continues to stand by as a spectator.Yet an ambition of this kind collides with a reality no less firm: the texts of international law. The Strait of Hormuz is not an Iranian matter; it is an international passage on which global energy markets, supply chains, international trade, and international communications lines all depend.Therefore, any attempt to change the rules of passage or impose a new interpretation of maritime law will not be met with rejection by Gulf states alone; it will face objection from the major powers, which regard freedom of navigation as a fundamental pillar of the existing international order.For this reason, the coming period is likely to be one of prolonged political and legal struggle rather than direct military confrontation. The issue is no longer solely about a nuclear agreement or the lifting of sanctions; it concerns the redrawing of the balance of influence in the Gulf.The competing forces within the Iranian system will attempt to present any gain in Hormuz as evidence of their success, while the international community will be keen to prevent maritime passages from being turned into instruments of influence or political extortion. The battle has moved from the sky to the sea, and from missiles to international law — and this shift may prove more complex, longer-lasting, and more costly, because the dispute is no longer about the borders of geography but about who holds the right to set the rules of influence in the region.
Monday, 13 July 2026, 12:54 AM
With Iran resuming its bombardment of oil and gas tankers in and near the Strait of Hormuz, it may be too early to believe that the latest war between the United States and Iran has truly ended. It is true that the major direct military confrontation has stopped.
Negotiating rounds continue behind closed doors in search of new understandings, yet the core of the conflict appears to have shifted from one arena to another. The battle today is no longer about exchanging strikes so much as it is about drawing the rules of influence in the Gulf, with the Strait of Hormuz sitting at the heart of this equation.
In the Iranian reading, Hormuz is not merely a waterway through which oil and gas tankers and commercial vessels pass; it is a strategic card that can redefine Iran's regional standing. Hence the Iranian insistence on granting itself an exceptional role in managing the strait, culminating in entrenching a vision that makes passage through it subject, in one way or another, to its political will.
For this reason, ideas about imposing transit fees, service charges, or special arrangements are persistently repeated from time to time. These appear on the surface to be technical measures, but in reality they are an attempt to reinterpret settled norms of international law in a way that grants a single state a privilege incompatible with the legal nature of international maritime passages.
This orientation cannot be separated from Tehran's domestic calculations. The regime faces accumulated economic pressures, and the power centres that hold decision-making authority need to offer something that can be marketed to domestic public opinion as a political achievement following a costly period of escalation. The issue of Hormuz thus appears to be the prime candidate to serve as the headline of this
