The centre of tension lies in the South China Sea near the Philippines, and its cause is Manila's accusation that Beijing has placed strange surveillance devices in the Scarborough Shoal — known to Filipinos as "Bajo de Masinloc" or "Panatag."
China has controlled these coral reefs since 2012, despite a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favour of Manila, on the grounds that the shoal falls within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. China ignored the ruling and maintained its control over the area, with its forces even clashing with the boats of ordinary Filipino fishermen.
What is different this time is that the repercussions have extended to other countries in the region. It is true that the Philippines' partners in ASEAN did not stand in solidarity with Manila, out of fear for their trade and economic interests with the Chinese dragon. Indeed, one of Manila's geographically closest partners, Indonesia, had its finance minister in Beijing at precisely that moment, exploring ways to elevate his country's relations with Beijing and develop their economic and financial ties.
However, a country outside ASEAN — Japan — decided to side with the Philippines. The official statement issued on 28 May at the conclusion of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s visit to Tokyo stated that the two countries intend to hold bilateral talks on delimiting their respective exclusive economic zones (with an exception for Taiwan, which lies between the Philippines and Japan).
This did not sit well with China, whose foreign ministry issued a statement on 7 June describing the boundary delimitation negotiations between the Philippines and Japan as null and void and illegal. Moreover, Beijing swiftly dispatched armed patrols to the area and explicitly announced that those patrols were a direct response to the Japan–Philippines negotiations.
These Chinese measures widened the circle of the dispute to include Taiwan, which was itself provoked by the Chinese response — which included conducting patrols near its eastern coastline — and consequently decided to deploy its warships to monitor passing commercial vessels and query them by radio about their cargo and destinations.
Taiwan's foreign ministry had praised the Manila–Tokyo agreement in a statement issued on 31 May and expressed its aspiration to cooperate with both countries in maintaining maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region — a statement that drew China's ire and criticism.
In our view, China's reactions fall within the category of its fears about the possibility of Japan's military re-emergence and the expansion of its influence in the region, particularly given that Japan's leader Sanae Takaichi is intent on gradually abandoning the restrictions imposed on her country's military capabilities since the Second World War, as a natural response to developments in the world — among them the unprecedented military rise of the Chinese dragon and its support for the Russian bear on multiple fronts in its war against Ukraine.
On another front, Beijing today appears more anxious and sensitive than ever towards any Japanese move, let alone one between Japan and the Philippines — two countries that encircle Taiwan and between which exists what is known as the Reciprocal Access Agreement, concluded in September 2025.
This agreement permits joint military exercises, the exchange of intelligence information, and the deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Forces on Philippine territory. In this context, one must refer to Takaichi's statement in November 2025, which stirred a storm of outrage in Chinese circles, when she declared that any Chinese attack on Taiwan could prompt Japan to take a counter-military action on the grounds of self-defence.
A number of observers have said that Beijing asked US President Donald Trump, during his recent summit with Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in May, to rein in his Japanese and Philippine allies and pressure them to halt their military cooperation, if he wanted stability in the region.
In conclusion, the South China Sea is witnessing a series of developments and counter-developments in which historical claims are intertwined with economic competition and geographical friction, leaving the situation open to all possibilities — especially since the dispute here pits a major power seeking to consolidate its influence and interests against smaller states that aspire to nothing more than protecting their national security, sovereignty, and rights.
China, as we have noted, feels threatened by anything that could impede its drive to emerge as a dominant global power. It therefore multiplies its veiled messages to Manila, Tokyo, and Taipei — and to Seoul and the ASEAN capitals as well — to the effect that the United States will not protect you.
It will not be able to stop China's rise. This has manifested in threats to those who accuse it of expansionism: yet further expansion of its sovereignty over the waters east of Taiwan, and the construction of more bases on the disputed islands.