What will happen in the 60 days?

What can happen during the 60-day period between the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran and the reaching of a final agreement on Iran's nuclear programme and its relations with the United States?

That is the question many are seeking to answer after the memorandum of understanding was indeed signed, remotely, on Wednesday evening between US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The ideal answer to this question is that the majority of countries in the region hope for a swift final agreement that delivers security and stability for all, and naturally fulfils each party's stated objectives. The realistic answer, however, is that based on the experience of recent months and weeks, nothing is guaranteed whatsoever, and therefore all possibilities remain on the table.

On 28 February, the war began with a US-Israeli attack on Iran; Iran did not confine itself to retaliating against Israel but also struck Gulf states. On 8 April, an extremely fragile truce was reached, punctuated by intermittent attacks between the various parties, until the announcement last week that a memorandum of understanding had been reached. It was formally signed two days ago while Trump was at the Palace of Versailles on the sidelines of the G7 summit.

We return to the question with which we began: what will happen during the two-month period?

Analysing the positions of the principal parties to the conflict, what has been declared so far includes US President Donald Trump's statement last Tuesday that he expects a final agreement to be reached quickly — even before the 60 days stipulated in the memorandum of understanding have elapsed.

On the American position more broadly, it is no longer a secret that Trump has come to fear that the continuation of the war could exact a heavy price on his Republican Party in next autumn's midterm congressional elections, particularly given the sustained rise in oil and energy prices, which have increased by more than 45% in the United States.

In the moments following the announcement of the memorandum of understanding, prices began to fall, with Brent crude recording around $77 a barrel last Thursday for the first time since the outbreak of war on 28 February. This sharp decline was not solely due to the agreement, but also to the US decision to lift its blockade on Iranian seaports and allow Tehran to sell its oil. It is in Trump's interest to reach a clear final agreement that categorically prevents Iran from possessing or acquiring nuclear weapons and dismantles its missile systems and regional proxies.

During the 60 days we will witness entirely contradictory statements from Trump — some praising Iran and its leaders, others threatening it with dire consequences. He himself said that if Iran does not sign an agreement within the two-month period he will resume bombing it.

In any case, Trump believes he has achieved a great victory and has destroyed Iran's nuclear and conventional military capabilities.

As for Iran, in all likelihood it will continue its well-established method of manoeuvring, buying time and running out the clock, particularly as it claims it will recover some of its frozen funds — though America flatly denies this. Washington also insists it has succeeded in opening the Strait of Hormuz without the imposition of public Iranian transit fees.

The third party is Israel, which can be described as the expected «blocking third». The agreement fulfils none of Israel's major objectives: the toppling of the Iranian regime, the complete destruction or dismantlement of the nuclear programme, the curtailment of the missile programme, and the elimination or weakening of Iran's regional proxies. The Israelis have expressed their dissatisfaction with Trump's agreement with Iran both publicly and privately, and will consequently seek by every means to provoke problems and crises — particularly on the Lebanese front — in order to derail the agreement and reignite the war until all of Israel's stated objectives are achieved.

We know full well that the majority of Israeli opposition parties, and indeed some of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's own far-right allies, believe that Israel emerged as a loser from the way the war ended. Netanyahu's greatest problem is the pressure Trump is applying on him to withdraw from Lebanon or halt the fighting; more seriously, there is the risk of open conflict between the two men, especially as Trump has begun publicly criticising Netanyahu and telling him plainly: stop stirring up problems and act responsibly — a message his Vice President JD Vance has echoed.

There is supposed to be a fourth, integral party — the Arab side, which opposed the outbreak of war from the outset, declared it would not permit its airspace to be used in the war, and was subjected to sustained Iranian attacks. Washington is not supposed to overlook this, nor to pursue solely its own interests and those of Israel, nor to repeat the mistake of Obama's 2015 agreement with Iran. During the 60 days ahead, Trump will therefore seek to conclude a swift agreement in which Iran clearly declares it will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, so that he can claim to have achieved what Obama did not.

Iran will seek to extract the maximum possible gains, particularly the release of some of its frozen funds. And Israel will seek to sabotage the agreement by every means available, because its core objectives have not been met.

In summary: over the two-month period we can expect to see many leaks and media battles, and perhaps some skirmishes launched from the Lebanese front, as each party strives to achieve its objectives or the maximum possible share of them.