In the early hours of last Sunday, something unprecedented occurred in Iraq over the past two and a half decades: a fierce storm struck at the pillars of corruption within the country's political system. After years of promises that the Iraqi people had long awaited, the Iraqi authorities launched the largest and most sweeping anti-financial-corruption and abuse-of-power campaign in years, dismantling networks described as "corruption whales."

The campaign included the arrest of senior officials and members of parliament inside the fortified Green Zone. This time, Prime Minister Ali Al-Sudani did what none of his predecessors had done — he crossed red lines without hesitation. This confirms that when the state possesses the will, it is capable of imposing its authority and its law, and that what has taken place should not be viewed as the end of a battle, but rather the beginning of a new course that may redefine the relationship between the state and political power.

The campaign triggered a major legal surprise that could destabilize the entire political process and push the country toward early elections. Signs of political repercussions — no less significant than its judicial outcomes — have already begun to emerge, after the judiciary spoke of the use of public funds in electoral campaigning. This has opened a debate about the possibility of challenging the results of the most recent elections if it is proven that political money altered the balance of competition.

Corruption in Iraq is a structural challenge that has accumulated since after 2003, evolving into a complex network of patronage and power-sharing. Yet the arrest of individuals who were previously untouchable thanks to the "sectarian quota shield" is a step that demonstrates a clear seriousness on the part of the Prime Minister to clean and purge Iraq of its corruption whales — though its success depends on uprooting the very foundations of corruption and the quota system that have been responsible for years of chaos in Iraq.

Since 2003, not a single Iraqi government has been without an anti-corruption discourse. An Integrity Commission, an oversight board, a judiciary, investigative committees, supreme councils, repeated pledges — and yet corruption has remained capable of shedding its skin and returning through another window.

Anti-corruption operations are no longer limited to pursuing small bribes; they have moved on to confronting systematic and structural theft targeting the financial nerve of the state. The significance of the campaign lies in this escalation to advanced political and administrative levels, having reached prominent figures within parliament and political blocs — making it a serious test of the principle of accountability within state institutions. Ending corruption in Iraq will only be possible if genuine political will is present. But political forces must support the Prime Minister's measures in a mission that all previous governments have failed to accomplish.

Among the world's wealthiest oil-producing nations, yet simultaneously among the poorest — this is what corruption has made of Iraq, turning it into a global landmark of the phenomenon despite the efforts of successive governments. Iraq has suffered for long years from administrative and financial corruption, to the point that it has become one of the most entrenched challenges hindering the course of development and burdening the ordinary citizen.

A number of observers confirm that partisan and sectarian quota-sharing is the incubating environment for entrenched financial and administrative corruption, as it divides state institutions and their resources into spheres of influence.

The true success of this campaign therefore depends on its continuity and its refusal to be limited to specific cases or individuals, but rather its extension to all major corruption files without exception. Enlisting international investigators and competent international courts is the optimal path to combating the corrupt and reflects a genuine desire to build state institutions.

While some observers believe that current moves may represent a real opportunity to break entrenched corruption networks, others warn that their success will remain contingent on the government's ability to overcome political selectivity and convert investigations into judicial verdicts and the actual recovery of looted funds.

There is no doubt that correcting the political process in Iraq lies in striking the corrupt leaderships that have been responsible for the failure of state institutions throughout the past period, exposing the facts to public opinion, and issuing just judicial rulings that translate the principle that public funds are a red line and the law stands above all.

There is no doubt that the Al-Sudani government is exerting efforts to completely topple the corruption whales, but what matters most is its ability to bring the major corruption files to a conclusion — and this requires a convergence of internal and external efforts, as well as international and judicial support, in order to reach the most important sources and enablers of corruption.

Iraq needs a comprehensive national project built on clear pillars: the rule of law for all without exception, and the combating of corruption in every joint of the state from top to bottom. It is also necessary to work in parallel on designing and implementing a sound political and economic system that closes the loopholes allowing corruption to emerge, and to combat it when it does appear through legislation.

These developments undoubtedly reinforce the impression that the current measures represent an attempt to change some of the constants that have governed the political process over the past two decades, rather than mere judicial procedures.

The campaigns targeting Iraq's "corruption whales" place the legitimacy of political representation and electoral outcomes under scrutiny, with sources having spoken of the involvement of stolen public funds in financing previous electoral campaigns for some candidates. Nevertheless, legal experts and advisers believe that the complete annulment of election results is unlikely — technically and politically.